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What have the MDGs achieved? And what might their achievements mean for any second 
generation of MDGs or MDGs 2.0? We argue that the MDGs may have played a role in increasing 
aid and that development policies beyond aid quantity have seen some limited improvement in 
rich countries (the evidence on policy change in poor countries is weaker). Further, there is some 
evidence of faster-than-expected progress improving quality of life in developing countries since the 
Millennium Declaration, but the contribution of the MDGs themselves in speeding that progress 
is—of course—difficult to demonstrate even assuming the MDGs induced policy changes after 
2002. The paper concludes with reflections on what the experience of MDGs in terms of global 
goal setting has taught us and how things might be done differently if there were to be a new set of 
MDGs after 2015. Any MDGs 2.0 need targets that are set realistically and directly link aid flows to 
social policy change and to results.
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What have the MDGs achieved? And what might their achievements mean for any second 
generation of MDGs or MDGs 2.0? It is a lot to ask of one legally toothless document, 
silent on the necessary steps to achieve its declared goals, to dramatically and observably 
change the course of global development -- however grand the signatories. Perhaps this is 
particularly the case when specific targets in the Millennium Declaration largely repeated 
language fashioned at previous UN summits over the course of the 1990s (and some, 
including the goal of universal education repeated language from declarations as early as 
1934). Nevertheless, a range of papers in the early 2000s estimated costs of achieving the 
MDGs, while some suggested the policy changes that might be required. And repeated 
MDG progress tracking exercises by the UN and the World Bank continue to utilize the 
MDGs as a tool to advance reform of aid and development policy. All of this suggests a 
widespread hope that the MDGs would make a real-world difference in speeding 
development progress, so it is not unreasonable to ask if such progress has been achieved. 
There is widespread agreement that the MDGs have placed broad-based poverty reduction 
at the center of the development agenda at least in international discussions and policy 
discourse (Watkins, 2011). If the benchmark of success is the number of donor reports and 
poverty strategies written that include measures of MDG progress, or summit meetings that 
highlight the MDGs, the Goals have been overwhelmingly more successful than the UN 
development decades (Manning, 2009). More broadly, Figure 1 suggests that the MDGs 
have become a considerable topic of discussion at least in books written English. The figure 
reports on the number of times the phrases “GDP per capita” “Human Development 
Index” and “Millennium Development Goals” have been mentioned in books published 
between 1980 and 2006 as scanned by the Google Books project (which already includes 
more than five percent of the books ever published) (Michel et al., 2011). “GDP per capita” 
and “Human Development Index” are used as the ‘consensus development goals’ prior to 
the MDGs. As can be seen, GDP per capita still leads, but the phrase “Millennium 
Development Goals” has overtaken “Human Development Index” and, as of 2006, appears 
to be rapidly closing on GDP per capita. This is no small accomplishment in terms of 
framing the discussion –even while only five percent of Americans, six percent of Chinese 
and one quarter of Norwegians surveyed have heard of the MDGs, according to the World 
Values Survey (Manning, 2009).  
At the same time, some of the constituent elements of the MDGs do not appear to be 
gaining in terms of attention paid in English-language books. Figure 2 suggests the terms 
“child mortality”, “maternal mortality”, “absolute poverty” or “school completion” have  
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become no more widely used since the MDGs were launched (for those viewing the figure in 
black and white, from top to bottom the lines in 1980 at the left of the chart run maternal 
mortality, child mortality, absolute poverty, and school completion).  
Furthermore, the purpose of the MDGs was not merely or primarily to change thinking but 
to change policies and outcomes. They were designed to “encourage sustainable pro-poor 
development progress and donor support of domestic efforts in this direction” (Manning, 
2009). Have they succeeded in this regard? Perhaps reflecting a greater impact on general aid 
and development dialogue than discussion of specific development topics, the evidence in 
favor of ‘donor support of domestic efforts’ is stronger than that in favor of ‘pro-poor 
development progress.’ Perhaps again this should come as no surprise, given the Goals were 
first compiled as OECD DAC targets (albeit DAC targets drawn from UN agreements of 
the 1990s). 
In light of the likely debate on a second generation of MDGs, here we ask:  
a)  Have the MDGs led to greater resource mobilization at both global and national 
level and policy change by donors and governments? (ie more money) 
b)  What is the record on poverty reduction progress during the period of the MDGs? 
(ie more development) 
Note this paper asks if the MDGs as agreed might have had an impact on progress in the 
areas covered. It does not discuss if the goals themselves were the right ones. There is a 
considerable debate as to whether there should have been goals covering growth, 
governance, violence or learning for example. There is no analysis of the potential negative 
spillover effects of any greater focus that the MDGs achieved on their target areas in terms 
of reduced attention to these other areas.1 Nor does the paper discuss the level of ambition 
of the goals beyond a looking at the suitability of using ‘on track/off track’ measures as an 
indicator of MDG impact. These issues are analyzed in the sibling paper, which discusses 
some potential changes to the goals and a set of ‘straw-man’ targets for any MDGs 2.0 (see 
Kenny & Sumner, 2011b). Finally, we focus our analysis on the development goals actually 
enumerated in the Millennium Declaration: 
“We resolve further: To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
and, by the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to 
afford safe drinking water… To ensure that, by the same date, children everywhere, boys 
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling and that girls and 
boys will have equal access to all levels of education…. By the same date, to have reduced 
                                                       
1 Having said that, the last decade has seen a considerable decline in war deaths and the number of major 
civil conflicts ongoing worldwide suggesting the (unsurprising, perhaps) conclusion that the MDGs not 
mentioning civil conflict was not itself a significant spark for such conflict, at the least.   
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maternal mortality by three quarters, and under-five child mortality by two thirds, of their 
current rates… To have, by then, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
the scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity….” 
While (even) these targets listed in the citation above have no legal weight, at least they were 
in fact agreed by the heads of state –unlike the considerably longer list of targets and 
indicators appended to the MDG process over the course of the year or so that followed the 
declaration.2 (Although one could make the case that the MDGs were informally endorsed at 
the UN Conference on International Financing for Development at Monterrey in 2002, 
because funding commitments made on the basis of the MDGs were made there). If it is 
difficult to find an impact on progress regarding these goals, it would surely be even harder 
with the targets and indicators. 
We use a range of approaches towards evaluating change from the pre- to post-MDG 
period, including before and after comparisons in levels and changes, as well as before and 
after changes controlling for initial conditions. By and large the approaches are driven by the 
quality and extent of the data. And in all cases, we should emphasize at the outset that our 
ability to make strong causal statements is considerably limited. We do not outline a 
complete theory of change spanning from the Declaration at the UN through policy change 
to outcome, nor do we test that theory using comprehensive multivariate analysis. At the 
most, we can suggest if the pattern of data fails to contradict a story that suggests the MDGs 
led to more aid and/or policy change which in turn led to improved outcomes. 
We argue that the MDGs may have played a role in increasing aid, that development policies 
beyond aid quantity have seen limited improvement in rich and poor countries alike, but that 
there is some evidence of faster progress towards quality of life in developing countries since 
the Millennium Declaration (a role for the MDGs themselves in speeding that progress is 
less straightforward to demonstrate). The paper concludes with reflections on the experience 
of the MDGs in terms of global goal setting and how things might be done differently if 
there were to be a new set of MDGs post-2015.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews what has actually changed – the money 
or the policies. Section 3 assesses broad-based poverty reduction during the MDG era. 
Section 4 concludes.  
In this section we discuss if the MDGs have led to greater resource mobilization at both 
global and national level. 
 
                                                       
2 See for a detailed MDG history Manning (2009)  
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Despite the fact there was no target for aid flows enumerated in the MDGs (a subject of 
some criticism), given the MDGs’ evolution in the halls of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, it is unsurprising that the easiest case to make regarding the 
impact of the MDGs may be with aid flows. Figure 3 tracks the course of global ODA since 
1990. As can be seen, the 1990s were a period of stagnation in aid flows while the period 
since the Millennium Declaration has seen resurgence in growth of aid flows. Between 2000 
and 2009, ODA climbed from $72 to $128 billion (Levels were no higher than in 1991 
measured as a percentage of rich country GDP, however).  
Furthermore, aid flows shifted towards income groups and countries that faced some of the 
greatest challenges meeting the MDGs. Figure 4 illustrates per capita aid flows to low and 
middle income countries.3 As can be seen, the growth in global aid flows was focused on low 
income countries, with per capita allocations rising from $27 to $47 between 2000 and 2009. 
This reversed a dramatic decline in per capita flows to the poorest countries in the previous 
ten years (although it is likely to reflect in part the graduation to middle income status of 
some large countries with comparatively low per-capita aid receipts). Figure 5 shows how 
ODA to countries in sub-Saharan Africa in particular also reversed a trend of decline from 
1990-2000 to 2000-2010. Aid to the region increased from $12 billion to $42 billion 2000-
2009 –more than tripling.  
Regression analysis on data from 1995 to 2009 also suggests that over that period smaller 
population countries have received more ODA as a percentage of total GDP when 
compared to larger countries.4 This would be consistent with a story that suggested donors 
were attempting to maximize the number of countries that would meet the MDGs. 
The sectoral allocation of aid flows also suggests a greater focus on ‘MDG priority areas.’ 
Sumner and Tiwari note that absolute bilateral social sector ODA spending doubled 2000-
2008 while productive sector ODA stagnated (see Figures 6 & 7) (Sumner & Tiwari, 2011). 
Figure 8, which includes multilateral flows, suggests a somewhat more nuanced picture with 
regard to health and education in particular, but still some evidence of an uptick in these 
sectors’ share of total aid flows since 2000. Of course, aid is controlled by the same agencies 
that agreed the DAC targets, suggesting that it is possible the aid shift to social sectors might 
have occurred even absent the MDGS. Some evidence that the Goals themselves may have 
played a role is suggested by Figure 9, which suggests the timing of the uptick was post-
                                                       
3 With countries defined by their low or middle income status in each year –so that the sample of countries 
in each category changes over the period. 
4 The two years compared in the regression are 1995 and 2009. The log of population and the log of GDP 
per capita are used to predict ODA as a % of GDP in the given year. The coefficient on the log of population is 
negative with a greater magnitude in 2009 (β=-0.037) than in 1995 (β=-0.019) and nearly twice the magnitude for 
the log of GDP per capita from 1995 to 2009 (β=-0.063 and β=-0.116, respectively). All results are significant at 
a level of 0%. There are no controls applied.  
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MDG (2001), rather than earlier in response to the DAC targets. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting the creation and funding of institutions including the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization as well as the US President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief does 
suggest there was increased donor attention to the MDG areas of child health and 
combating HIV/AIDS in particular over the last ten years (although the second was 
introduced by an administration with no love for the MDGs). 
The MDGs did not suggest or necessarily require an increase in national spending on social 
sectors (in that sense, the complaint about the lack of policy targets in MDG 8 applies to 
developing countries as well). Nonetheless, one measure of the impact of the MDGs on 
policies might have been an increase in such spending. Figures 10 & 11 look at changes in 
domestic spending on health and education as a percentage of GDP in low and middle-
income countries. While it is hard to detect a trend, as GDP/capita grew in the vast majority 
of developing countries during the last decade, there will have been an increase in absolute 
per capita spending. One could also point to commitments made by African governments at 
Abuja in 2001 to spend 15% of total government expenditure and the 2006 Maputo Plan of 
Action on 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights or more recently the AU’s Campaign on Accelerated 
Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) in 2009 which seeks to increase the 
availability and use of health services. 
The figures suggest that low income countries spend about 8% of their GDP on health and 
education. This equals about $41 per capita (at market rates). Compare this to aid funding of 
around $7.50 per capita for health and education in low income countries, it is clear that 
domestic financing decisions would dominate outcomes, all else equal.  
At the same time, the total increase in aid flows was, interestingly, about the increase called 
for by MDG costing studies –which suggested that, were the MDGs to have been met by 
2015, the effort would have cost around $50 billion (Moss, 2010). The increase also tracked 
to MDG priorities, and had a focus on countries facing the biggest challenges in meeting the 
MDGs. This might be considered to provide a reasonably good test of the assumed 
centrality of aid resources to achieving the development outcomes outlined by the MDGs. If 
so, we will see that the picture is not terribly reassuring on the link. 
One indirect measure of donor policy change in order to further progress towards the 
MDGs is to look at how much their policy statements reflect MDG priority areas. In this 
regard, Fukuda-Parr (2010), p. 29, notes: 
aid policy statements of major bilateral donors align with the MDG priorities only partially 
and in varying ways… While multidimensional poverty – including income poverty,  
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education and health – is the stated central policy objective of almost all the bilateral aid 
programs, some objectives such as maternal mortality and child survival receive surprisingly 
limited emphasis.  
Table 1 lists the top 10 most commonly selected MDG priorities in review of 20 donor 
programmes. It is clear that there is a considerable adoption of MDG priority areas, however 
there is equal or higher adoption of priorities not in the MDGs (although these topics are 
mentioned in the broader Millennium Declaration). This might suggest that the impact of 
the MDGs on donor policy priorities may have been limited. In turn, this suggests that 
despite the fact that aid flows as a whole increased in the period after the Millennium 
Declaration, the impact of the MDGs themselves may have been more limited than a simple 
post hoc ergo propter hoc argument would suggest. 
Table 1: MDG Priorities in Donor Program Strategies, 2003-2007 
  Core priority  
   
MDG 1 - Income poverty   13/21 
MDG 2 - Education  15/21 
MDG 3, 4, 5 - Health  14/21 
MDG  7 - Water and sanitation  10/21 
MDG 6 – HIV/AIDS and global diseases  12/21 
MDG 7 - Environment  19/21 
Other   
Human rights  17/21 
Governance  15/21 
Peace and Security  15/21 
Democracy  14/21 
 
 
Source: Fukuda-Parr (2008, p. 11-13). Notes: Review of 20 bilateral aid programmes and one multilateral 
(EU) via policy statements and MDG reports. See Fukuda-Parr (2010, p. 20-23) for full list of donor document 
reviewed. ‘Core priority’ defined as ‘whether it mentioned an MDG priority as: an important objective or a core 
strategic objective, such as constituting one of the “pillars” of the strategy; whether an action plan was developed 
and articulated in a section of the document; and whether numerical targets were set. This effort sought to 
distinguish rhetorical “priorities” from those that were actually being implemented’ (p.9). 
 
Of course, as the language in MDG 8 makes clear, there is far more to developed country 
support for progress towards the Goals than aid alone. While Goal 8 is notably free of 
specific targets regarding rates of progress, it covers topics including trade, investment and 
finance. Have donor governments improved their policy performance in these areas since 
2000? One way to examine this issue is to look at the CGD Commitment to Development 
Index, which rates donor countries on their policies that impact development prospects  
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across a range of areas including aid, trade, investment, finance and migration.5 Figure 12 
presents the CDI for 2003 and 2010 weighted and unweighted by GDP. As can be seen, the 
trend is positive, especially for the larger countries in the index. One reason for this will be 
increased aid commitments, which are part of index scoring. Stripping out the aid 
component of the CDI, however, Figure 13 suggests that improvement has been more 
widespread than aid alone, and Figure 14, examining the trade component, suggests 
particular advances there. 
On the side of developing countries, a recent UNDP/Columbia University study of 30 
countries revealed that 25 had adopted and adapted the MDG goals or indicators (see 
examples from Africa in Table 2). The UNDP (2010, p. 8) is not clear why these 30 
countries were chosen for the survey but does say each of the 30 countries ‘had some form 
of national process or institutional framework in place that was concerned with formulating, 
implementing and/or monitoring programmes and policies in support of MDG 
achievement’. This would mean it was not a random sample, and even if it were, there can be 
considerable gaps between strategy articulation and policy implementation, of course. 
UNDP (2010, p. 10) also notes that in 118 countries, 86% of countries had adapted the one 
or more of the goals, their targets or associated indicators. In the sample of 30 countries, 25 
had. Given the sample was chosen of countries with national MDG-related process this is 
not so surprising. In fact one might surprised that all 30 had not adapted some of the MDGs 
in some manner. 
We can consider measures of actual policy change as well as strategies to examine if the 
MDG period has been associated with improved policies in MDG priority areas. One 
measure is provided by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) process, which (inter alia) scores low-income countries on their development policies 
and the quality of their institutions, with scores from 0 (absent) to 6 (perfect). It does this 
against a consistent questionnaire instrument to reduce subjectivity in the scores. Figure 15 
reports on regional average scores on the CPIA in 2005 (the earliest available year) and 2009 
weighted by country population. The scores suggest minor improvement in scores for East 
Asia and Eastern Europe, but the broader story is one of stagnation –with no region seeing 
an improvement greater than 0.2 on a 0 to 6 scale. The Social Inclusion index of the CPIA is 
designed to measure policy efforts towards gender equality, equity of public resource use, 
building human resources, social protection and labor and policies and institutions for 
environmental sustainability. Figure 16 reports on regional scores and, once again, there is 
no evidence of strongly improved outcomes. 
We have some measures of health sector effort that can complement these more general 
measures of policy quality with reference to the child and maternal mortality goals: they 
involve birth attendance by skilled health professionals (Figure 17) and vaccination rates 
(Figures 18 & 19). There has been a slight rise in skilled attendance –by about six percentage  
                                                       
5 See www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/   
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Table 2. MDG national ownership in selected sub-Saharan African countries 
Country  National processes of MDG 
localisation 
Adaption of 
goals or targets 
Adaption of 
indicators 
Botswana  Country’s Vision 2016 and National 
Development Plan for 2009-2016 
matches the MDGs. 
Y   
Ethiopia  National development plan, 
PASDEP (2005-2010) prioritises 
MDG achievements. 
  Y 
Ghana  The GPRS II (2006-09) explicitly 
focuses on the MDGs, which also 
have been given a separate section in 
the annual budget statement; civil 
society prepared MDG shadow 
report. 
Y  Y 
Malawi  The Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy (2006-2011) is 
a MDG-focused national plan; civil 
society is active in producing shadow 
MDG reports led by the Council of 
NGOs in Malawi. 
  Y 
Mozambique  MDGs incorporated into the second 
PARPA (national poverty reduction 
strategy). 
   
Senegal  The President established a Special 
Presidential Adviser on the MDGs 
and appointed a national steering 
committee to coordinate the national 
response for MDG achievement. 
Y  Y 
Sierra Leone  The 2nd Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS) focuses 
explicitly on the MDGs, with the 
Office of the President leading its 
implementation and oversight. 
Y   
Tanzania  MDGs mainstreamed into 
Development Vision 2025 and 
medium term plan MKUKUTA, and 
for Zanzibar. 
Y  Y 
Togo  Adopted a National Development 
Strategy based on the MDGs (2007). 
  Y 
Source: Extracted from UNDP (2010) based on National MDG Reports.  
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points in low income countries between 2000 and 2008, for example-- there is insufficient 
data to look at long-term trends. The picture is more positive regarding immunizations –a 
stagnation in low-income vaccination rates in the 1990s has given way to a notable upward 
trend. This will be in part related to the considerable resources mobilized for worldwide 
vaccination programs through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, 
suggesting this may be a case where the causal chain from aid and policy to interventions to 
outcomes, at least, is comparably strong.  
This section assesses poverty reduction progress under the MDGs via various different 
methods available. It is worth noting that we will not know until at least 2017-2019 which 
goals were met–and given the lack of baseline data we may never know for some goals. For 
example, we still lack poverty and hunger data to make up to date estimates of country 
progress in the MDG target areas in Sub Saharan Africa for nearly half of the region’s 
countries (World Bank/IBRD, 2011). At the same time, we are far enough through the 
MDG time frame with sufficient enough data to be able to make some preliminary estimates 
of global progress –in most cases we have data covering more than half of the period 
between the turn of the Millennium and the MDG target date of 2015. 
 
As well as looking at the global level, we will also examine several ways to assess progress on 
the MDGs at the country level. A number of assessments emerged at the time of the 
September 2010 MDG summit. The first is Fukuda-Parr & Greenstein's (2010) comparisons 
of the rate of annual progress both before and after the introduction of the MDGs. The 
second is Leo & Barmeier's (2010) construction of the Center for Global Development’s 
MDG Progress Index which assesses how far a country is above or below the trajectory to 
meet the MDGs. The third is ODI/UNMC's (2010) league tables based on annual 
improvement rates in absolute and relative terms. We will report on these exercises and add 
an approach of our own based on deviations from a model of historical change.  
In this paper, we examine four questions: have MDG indicators improved? Have they 
improved fast enough for the world to be on track to meet the MDGs, have they improved 
faster than they did before the MDGs were agreed and have they improved faster than we 
would expect on the basis of historical patterns of change? One might question the need to 
go beyond asking ‘will we meet the MDGs?’ But from the point of view of ‘what have the 
MDGs accomplished’ the process would still have considerable value if it was (causally) 
associated with sustained or more rapid progress even without meeting the specific Goals 
laid out in 2000 and thereafter.  
It is worth repeating here that correlation does not necessarily imply causation and that the 
different approaches can lead to markedly different conclusions. Table 3 provides country  
 
10 
examples using child mortality in this regard, comparing measures of ‘on-track/off-track’ to 
Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein’s approach of examining faster or slower progress since 
agreement of the MDGs. Many countries with declining rates of progress since 2000 remain 
‘on track’ and many off-track countries have nonetheless increased rates of progress since 
the MDGs were agreed (See, for discussion, Pogge 2010).6  
It is also worth noting that with country-level analysis of progress, it may be over simple to 
suggest countries are ‘failing’ if they are not meeting the global MDG target. MDG architects 
have pointed out that the MDGs are intended to be global goals (see, for example, 
Vandemoortele & Delamonica, 2010). Of course the goal of 100% for the primary education 
MDG would only be possible if all countries met 100% coverage. Furthermore, the DAC 
actually adopted exactly the same global and local targets for infant and child mortality in 
1996. And Secretary General Annan’s ‘Road Map’ report to the UN General Assembly in 
2001 suggested that “it is crucial that the millennium development goals become national 
goals” (Manning, 2009). Nonetheless, the targets associated with particular goal areas do 
become significantly more ambitious if universally applied at the country level, which has 
become the norm in reports on MDG progress from the World Bank and the UN.  
The move from a global target of a halving of poverty or a two thirds reduction in child 
mortality to country-level monitoring on the basis that every country should achieve the 
MDG target reduction is, in effect, to ask for a dramatic acceleration of global progress. To 
understand why this is the case, examine Figure 20. In reaching a global target of a halving of 
poverty, for example, we would expect about half of all countries to more than halve poverty 
and half of countries to reduce poverty less than 50%. The average of leaders and laggards 
together is a 50% reduction. But if we move to the country level and suggest that every 
country needs to achieve a 50% reduction to avoid the stigma of MDG failure, this suggests 
we’ve shifted the distribution of outcomes considerably to the right. Put another way, if every 
country meets an MDG of 50% reduction, the average global reduction will be considerably 
higher than 50%.  
We can conservatively estimate what this change from global to country targets implied for 
rates of progress at the country level by looking at the distribution of outcomes for countries 
currently on track to meet particular MDG targets (see Figure 21). Taking this distribution, 
which is bounded at the lower end by the MDG rate of progress, as a model for a 
                                                       
6 Furthermore, the Millennium Declaration did not in fact include a baseline year for the goals included 
therein and the full set of Goals was not even set out until a year after that Declaration. Pogge (2011) argues that 
the resulting Goals were under-ambitious compared to earlier commitments, but (pace Vandemoortele and 
Delamonica, 2010) many suggested a rate of progress more rapid than historical rates, as we will see. For some 
Goals (and in particular maternal mortality) there was insufficient data to make realistic estimates of potential 
progress. Regardless, international goals are necessarily political and usually ‘stretch targets’ –in this case set nearly 
half way through the time given to complete them. For example, Clemens notes that the goal of universal primary 
education has been set by international fora meeting on 9 occasions since the 1930s (1934, 1948, 1951, 1962, 
1970, 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2000).  
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distribution in a world where every country meets the MDGs, we can estimate the average 
rate of global progress we would see if every country was at least meeting the MDGs.  
The results of such a distribution of outcomes is presented in Table 4 below. The table 
suggests that, looking at average rates of progress for those countries that are on track to 
meet the MDG goals, over the 25 year goal period, we would expect an average decline of 
65% in the prevalence of undernourishment (compared to a global goal of 50%), a 78% 
decline in the maternal mortality rate (compared to 75%), and a 71% decline in the child 
mortality rate (compared to 66%). It is also worth noting that the data suggests that 
countries on track to meet the MDGs show progress around one standard deviation above 
the average rate of progress for all countries on these three MDGs.  
Note our results are based on unweighted country averages, so should be taken as 
illustrative.7 At the same time, this is a conservative estimate because it might be more logical 
to take the actual distribution of world outcomes and just ‘shift’ it by the gap between the 
slowest progressing country and the rate of progress required to meet the MDGs (the model 
illustrated in the right panel of Figure 20).  
Regardless, given the MDGs were based on average global rates of progress and were then 
applied at the country level, our illustrative results suggest that the ‘on-track/off-track’ 
exercises are all based on the assumption of a considerably increased rate of global progress 
during the period of the MDGs. The logic underlying such an assumption is nowhere 
discussed in such exercises. And at the country level, some Goals are clearly over-ambitious 
compared to historical rates of progress. Easterly (2009, p. 29) and Clemens, et. al., (2007), 
both argued that the MDGs are ‘unfair’ to Africa as for some countries they would require 
progress at faster rates than any historical trajectory ever recorded.8  
To return to the broader question of the impact of MDGs on rates of progress, it is 
important to emphasize here that it is not clear if the widespread adoption of MDGs as 
country goals has had any practical impact on policies or outcomes. We have seen that aid is 
flowing increasingly to smaller population countries where the ‘cost’ of meeting MDG 
targets will be lower (all else equal) –but we have no evidence of a causal link. So there are 
missing elements to a causal story from MDGs through policy change to more rapid 
progress. 
                                                       
7 Unweighted averages imply Vanuatu and China are as important to determining global average rates of 
progress. They are not. So if China had seen far more dramatic progress ahead of an MDG target than Vanuatu, 
our estimates of the gap would be too low (and vice-versa).  
8 Another sleight of hand that the global development community has collectively undertaken is to measure 
‘global’ progress using a developing country sample. We do the same here, despite the fact that excluding high-
income countries has the effect of reducing the percentage of countries that are likely to reach any particular goal 
and altering the likely complexity of reaching ‘global’ goals –raising some (poverty) and reducing others (halving 
mortality).   
 
12 
Nonetheless, given that on/track/off track is at best a partial measure of the success of the 
MDGs, it is worth examining if the Goals may have been associated with the more modest 
target of speeding country progress in Goal areas from the period prior to their agreement. 
This has the added advantage that we are examining the impact of the Goals themselves on 
progress, rather than the impact of the Goals and ten years of policies and activities (1990-
2000) before the Goals were agreed. 
Table 3: On Track or Faster Progress as Measures of MDG Success 




















Libya  -1.9  -0.57  -1.35  “On Track”  Decline  
Mexico  -1.7  -1.14  -1.47  “Achieved”  Decline 




Gambia  -2.2  -3.14  -2.59  “Off Track”  Improvement 
Lesotho  +0.5  -3.29  -1.06  “Off Track”  Improvement 
Nigeria  -2.3  -2.57  -2.41  “Off Track”  Improvement 
Togo  -2.8  -3.14  -2.94  “Off Track”  Improvement 




Source: (Fukuda-Parr & Greenstein, 2012, forthcoming) 
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nourishment  31%  14  -45%  -11%  36%  -65%  -50% 
Maternal 
Mortality Rate  18%  18  -66%  -25%  43%  -78%  -75% 
Child 
Mortality Rate  40%  18  -59%  -40%  22%  -71%  -67% 
 
Tables 5 and 6 lay out the evidence regarding global and country-level progress towards the 
MDGs. At a global level, Table 5 presents evidence regarding the following questions: are 
the selected MDG indicators better than they were in 1990? how much of the distance to the 
MDGs has been achieved at the global level by 2008 according to the Global Monitoring 
Report? are we on track to meet the MDG target given global rates of progress 1990-2008? 
has the rate of progress increased from 1990-2000 to 2000-2008? and is the global rate of 
progress 2000-8 faster than would be predicted given historical patterns? 
At the country level, Table 6 presents evidence regarding the following questions: what 
percentage of countries see selected MDG indicators better than they were in 1990? what 
percentage of countries are on track to meet the MDG target given country rates of progress 
1990-2008? what percentage of countries have seen an increased rate of progress from 1990-
2000 to 2000-2008? and what percentage of countries have seen a rate of progress 2000-8 
faster than would be predicted given historical patterns? 
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Poverty   Y  80  Y  Y   
Under-
nourishment  
Y  77  N  N   
Primary 
Education  
Y  90  N  Y  N 
Gender 
Equality*  
Y  96  Y  N  N 
Child 
Mortality  
Y  69  N  Y  Y 
Maternal 
Mortality 
Y  57  N  Y  Y 
HIV/AIDS           
Drinking 
Water 
Y  88  Y  N   
*Primary education Source: Leo and Barmester (2010), World Bank, 2011, authors’ calculations. 
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Poverty   63  66  49  47  51   
Under-
nourishment  
55  57  34  25     
Primary 
Education  
75    46  55  35  68 
Gender 
Equality  
61    55  89/82**  46  56 
Child Mortality   95  95  38  36  32  51 
Maternal 
Mortality 
83    19  30    33 
HIV/AIDS  5      25     
Drinking Water  73  82  49  66  34   
Source: Leo and Barmeier (2010), ODI (2010), World Bank Global Monitoring Report 2011, & authors’ 
calculations using World Development Indicators and Hogan et. al. (2010) data  
1. % of countries with progress and on track are based on author’s calculations using Leo and Barmeier 
(2010) methodology 
*Represents the proportion of developing countries for which the appropriate data is available 
**Gender Equality for primary and secondary education, respectively 
 
Starting with the simplest question, it is worth asking if the World looks better than it did in 
1990? At the global level, the answer to that is a universal ‘yes’ for the indicators where we 
have data. Income poverty, undernourishment, child and maternal mortality are all rarer than 
they were in 1990 and primary completion (especially for girls) and access to clean water is 
more common.   
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The Global Monitoring Report suggests we are 80 percent of the way to reducing income 
poverty by half over 1990-2015, and 77 percent of the distance to halving under-nutrition (in 
other words, these figures are about 60 percent of their level in 1990). We have achieved 90 
percent primary completion in primary education, and girls’ enrollment is 96 percent of the 
level of boy’s enrollment. We are two thirds of the way to a two thirds reduction in child 
mortality, and a little over half way towards reducing maternal mortality by three quarters. 
While the data is less comprehensive, however, it is also clear that we have yet to reverse the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, at least in terms of prevalence and almost certainly in terms of new 
infections.  
At the country level, Leo and Barmeier’s data suggests that progress is widespread across a 
range of indicators. Three quarters or more of countries have seen progress in poverty, 
undernourishment, mortality and provision of clean drinking water. Nearly two thirds of 
countries have seen progress in gender equality –and others will have had no progress to 
achieve, starting the period with parity in school enrollment by gender. Only six percent of 
countries have actually reduced HIV prevalence –although 25 percent report prevalence 
rates no higher than they were in the 1990s. We should note here that new infections is the 
preferred MDG target indicator, but data is more sparse. We should also note in the 2011 
update of the MDG Progress Index, Leo and Thuotte (2001) note some changes and an 
underlying problem with the on-track/off-track exercise –considerable data revision. For 
example, Leo and Thuotte (2011, p. 6) estimate that as many as one-quarter of all countries 
or 31 of 76 countries with data revised their MDG 2 indicators for primary education 
completion rates: 
Overall, primary education completion rate data (either for baseline or more recent years) 
was retracted for sixteen developing countries. In addition, there are widespread data 
revisions which also have impacted progress performance levels. By illustration, baseline year 
data has been revised for 31 developing countries (nearly one-quarter of all countries). 
Figures 22, 23, 24 and 25 present developing country aggregate data on the $1.25 poverty 
rate, primary completion, under-five mortality and maternal mortality enabling us to measure 
progress at the global level. The diamonds present actual data, the thin grey line a fitted 
trend line over the entire period for which we have data and the thick red line an 
approximate indication of the trend line required to meet the MDG target for each of these 
goals. 
We are on track to meet the first MDG on poverty –a casual look at the figure suggests that 
the target was actually quite conservative given historical trends. This finding is consistent 
with the The World Bank (2011b, p. 11) Global Monitoring Report, which noted that the 
incidence of income poverty at $1.25 has fallen from 42% in 1990 to 25% in 2005 and is 
projected to fall to 14% in 2015. These figures represent a fall from 1.8bn poor people in 
1990 to 1.4bn in 2005 and a projected 0.9bn in 2015 (See Bussolo, de Hoyos, & Medvedev,  
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2008).9 A more optimistic estimate is that of Brookings economists Chandy & Gertz (2011, 
p. 11) who come to more optimistic conclusions of 9.9% poverty incidence in 2015 (0.6bn 
poor people). Ravallion (2011) has noted, and as recognized by Chandy and Gertz 
themselves the assumptions of Chandy and Gertz concerning static inequality may overstate 
the extent of poverty reduction to 2015 as may the assumption that all of the economic 
growth recorded in the national accounts is reflected in households mean consumption. The 
former - static inequality - may well particularly understate poverty reduction to 2015 in the 
case of fast growing countries, which include many new MICs. Much of course depends on 
growth projections for individual countries (most obviously, what happens in China and 
India and other large populous countries like Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia) as well as the 
evolution of income distribution within each country; any re-evaluation of PPPs in each 
country (and influence on $1.25 poverty) and population growth in individual countries (see 
discussion in Kanbur and Sumner, 2011). Nonetheless, the consensus poisiton appears to be 
that we will certainly meet the MDG of halving the proportion of the World’s population 
living on $1.25 a day. 
Regarding the other MDGs, the prognosis is patchy. At current rates of global progress, we 
should meet the goal for improved water and gender equality in basic education. But the 
world will not reach universal primary completion by 2015, and will miss the mortality and 
undernourishment goals.  
At the country level, Leo and Barmester (2010) suggests that around half of all countries are 
on track for the income poverty MDG,10 gender equality in schooling, universal primary 
                                                       
9 This estimate takes the global income distribution in 2000, assembled using data from household surveys 
for 1.2 million households in 84 developing countries and makes assumptions based on projections for 
demography (aging and shifts in the skill composition of the population; changes in the sectoral composition of 
employment; and economic growth (including changes in relative wages across skills and sectors). With regard to 
overall progress, note, however (i) if China is removed, the reduction the total number of extreme ($1.25) poor is 
less impressive. In 1990 there were 1.1bn poor people outside China; in 2005 there was actually 1.2bn but the 
projection is for 0.8bn poor people in 2015; (ii) If one uses the $2 poverty line - the average poverty line for 
developing countries - there will be still 2bn poor people in 2015 or 1.8bn excluding China and this is about the 
same as 1990; (iii)The number of poor people rose slightly in in South Asia, 1990-2005 although this should fall 
significantly by 2015 and the number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 300m in 1990 to 
almost 400m in 2005 and are the 2015 projection is for 350m. 
10 The most significant rates of poverty reduction, 1990-2005, have been achieved in East Asia and the 
Pacific with reductions of nearly 70% in the number of people living on less than $1.25 and over 50% reduction 
in the number of those with less than $2 a day. These positive trends are expected to continue to 2015 when the 
total number of people living below the $1.25 poverty line in East Asia and the Pacific is estimated to be 119m – 
just 13% of the 1990 figure. In South Asia, progression out of poverty has been slower. Between 1990 and 2005 
there was an increase in the number of people living below both the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines despite a 
decrease in proportional terms. The situation in this region is expected to improve by 2015. Poverty alleviation in 
sub-Saharan Africa has also been slow but is expected to improve by 2015. The number of people living on 




completion and expanded access to drinking water. Only 19 percent are on track for the 
maternal mortality goal and around a third for undernourishment.11  
Table 7. Comparisons of poverty (US$1.25) projections for 2015  
  % poor    millions 




  Chandy 
and Gertz 
World Bank 
East Asia  2.7  5.9    53.4  119.0 
Europe and Central 
Asia 
0.9  1.2    4.3  5.8 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
4.5  4.7    27.3  29.1 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
1.9  1.3    5.4  4.8 
South Asia  8.7  22.4    145.2  379.3 
Sub Saharan Africa  39.3  35.8    349.9  344.7 
World (developing 
countries) 
9.9  14.4    585.5  882.7 
Source: Chandy & Gertz, 2011 (p. 11); World Bank/IBRD, 2011. 
 
Figures 22, 23, 24 and 25 on developing country aggregate data suggest that in no case is 
there an obvious sign of a significant trend-break towards faster progress since 2000. 
Nonetheless, there has been somewhat faster global progress on income, primary 
completion rates, child and maternal mortality over the post-Declaration period.  
Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2011) provide evidence on faster or slower than previous 
progress during the MDG period at the country level and the picture is, once again, mixed. 
They take data on MDGs indicators for the earliest year post-1990 that it is available, a mid-
point year between 2000-2003 and the latest available data. They ask if progress has been 
more rapid or slowed down since the mid-point (Fukuda-Parr& Greenstein, 2010). As can 
                                                       
11 Similarly, Hogan et al (2010) conclude that only 23 out of 181 countries they examine were on track to 
reach MDG5 as of 2008.  
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be seen, only for income out of these indicators has progress accelerated during the period 
of the MDGs for the majority of countries.  
An alternate way of looking at rates of progress during the period of the MDGs is to ask ‘are 
countries under- or over-performing compared to what would be expected given historical 
progress on MDG indicators at the cross-country level?’ Here, we use a very simple model 
of the determinants of historical progress: 
Yt = β0 + β1(Yt-1) + β2(Yt-1)2 + µ 
where Yt is the value of the indicator at any time t excluding the base year, and Yt-1 is the 10-
year lag observation.12 The squared term is entered to capture curvature in the historical 
path. β1 and β2 are the regression coefficients, µ is the error term, and β0 the constant, which 
can be conceptually understood as the global trend in the indicator. Where the indicator is 
transformed to the log form (in the case of the child mortality rate and the maternal 
mortality rate), the square term is not entered into the estimation equation. (Lange and 
Klasen 2011) take a more sophisticated approach in a similar vein).  
Figures 26, 27, 28 and 29 below show the values that would be predicted for 2008 or 2009 
based on our model and actual values for 2000 relative to actual numbers for 2008 and 2009 
(depending on the availability of data per indicator), based on analysis of data from 1970-
2000 (also depending on the indicator). A predicted value for 2010 is then generated from 
the regression coefficients and the constant, and the applicable 2008 or 2009 predicted value 
extrapolated assuming constant change within each decade. The figures plot the actual value 
for the indicator in the end-line year against the predicted end-line value, wherein a data 
point on the 45-degree line represents a perfect prediction. Using this approach, 68 and 56 
percent of developing countries are seeing faster than predicted progress on primary 
education and gender equality in education, respectively; but fewer than 50 percent of 
countries are outperforming historical expectations on maternal mortality. With regards to 
the child mortality rate, slightly more than half (51%) of countries are outperforming the 
historical pattern. 
As can be observed in Table 8 below, for all indicators excluding the child mortality rate 
(CMR), unweighted averages suggest that progress has been faster than would have been 
predicted on the basis of historical norms. Moreover, the average CMR for developing 
countries is only one child below the predicted level for the most recent year available. Even 
more promising, the weighted averages for all four indicators suggest more progress: higher 
                                                       
12 An OLS estimation model can also be carried out controlling for country and time fixed effects (that is, 
creating individual country (k) and decade (j) dummies for k-1 countries and j-1 decades). Including these 
additional controls, however, does not modify the strength of the model tremendously, and as such is not crucial 
to this simple analysis.   
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primary completion rates, gender parity closer to one, and lower child and maternal mortality 
rates13.  































education  69  83%  78%  81%  76% 
Gender 
Equality  62  98%  96%  98%  96% 
Child 
Mortality*  142  58  57  51  54 
Maternal 
Mortality**  134  282  305  203  221 
Source: World Bank WDI (2011) & Hogan et al. (2010). *CMR is per 1,000 under 5 age children. *MMR 
value is per 100,000 live births. 
 
The results above should be interpreted with caution, since they represent a sub-sample in 
the entire grouping of countries for which predicted values were calculated. Coefficients on 
the lag variables were calculated using the entire sample of countries for which data was 
available, not only developing countries. As such, unweighted and weighted averages for 
primary education completion (for example) would suggest that countries should be doing 
better because the “curve” includes outliers on the high end, which in many cases were 
greater than one,14 and are pushing the predicted average further up (closer to 100% 
completion). Since these outliers are for the most part not included (these are typically 
developed countries), the averages across the sub-sample of developing countries is smaller.  
   
                                                       
13 MMR historical data from the World Bank and Hogan, et. al. (among other sources) is of course 
modeled, which would make a fitted model quite plausible. 
14 Since the data set used for primary education completion is the gross completion rate, some values for the 
endline year (2008) and earlier years (2000) were greater than 1 (i.e., greater than 100% completion)  
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Beyond the gender-specific targets and a 100% primary completion goal that requires 
absolute equality of outcomes worldwide, the MDGs do not highlight the issue of inequality 
of outcomes within countries. It is clear that such disparities are large –Table 9 presents data 
on inequalities in inputs outcomes for some of the MDGs broken down by gender, location 
and income. For example, a national average of 42 per cent of underweight children in South 
Asia sits in contrast to 56 per cent of the children underweight in the poorest quintile. 
Gender differences are more complicated as UNICEF (2011) argues in a systematic 
disaggregation of gender data. For example, in some cases gender disparities are worse for 
boys (outside Asia, under-ﬁve mortality is usually higher among boys than girls) or the same 
at early ages and worsening during adolescence (nutrition and health indicators are – in 
general – about the same at early ages – but adolescent girls are less likely to be literate than 
boys for example) or there are more complex interaction of gender and poverty (gender 
parity in education is much less likely in the poorest 20% group). 
The data is sparse to examine whether progress on MDG indicators has been faster or 
slower within countries for those groups previously furthest behind since the turn of the 
Millennium –this requires two nationally representative household surveys to have been 
conducted within a fairly short period. But looking at data from Vandemoortele and 
Delamonica (2010) on average versus poorest quintile rates of progress on child mortality 
for various countries during the first few years of the Twenty First Century (Table 10), just 
under half of countries saw faster progress (percentage drop) amongst the bottom quintile 
than average. This is a reasonably hopeful sign that progress has indeed been broad-based at 
least for this indicator.  
A final note on the exercises looking at the presence and speed of progress in MDG 
indicators since 1990 or since the Millennium Declaration: even ignoring the very limited 
evidence of faster progress since 2000 in the average (unweighted) developing country, it is a 
considerable step from ‘more rapid progress’ to ‘the MDGs caused more rapid progress’. 
This is particularly the case when it comes to any indicator that includes ten years of change 
prior to the Millennium Declaration itself.  
Given the comparatively weak evidence of country policy change beyond larger aid flows, 
and of improved outcomes, it is hard to see a clear causal chain from MDGs through policy 
change to more development. At the same time, we have no evidence against the 
counterfactual that progress may have been even slower absent the MDGs (and absent the 
additional aid flows). 
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Table 9: Selected MDGs and inputs: national averages vs women, rural populations and the poorest 
  MDG 1 - Underweight 
prevalence in children under 
ﬁve (%) 2003–2009 
 
Measles coverage %, 2008 
 




































































































































countries exc. China 
23  24  28  40    81  64  61  51    63  -  50  28 
Sub-Saharan Africa  22  21  25  29    72  58  55  45    46  -  36  24 
South Asia  42  42  45  56    74  59  58  44    42  -  33  17 
LDCs  28  27  30  34    76  65  62  56    38  -  29  24 
China  6  7  8  n.a.    94  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.    98  -  97  n.a 
India  43  43  46  57    70  56  54  40    47  -  38  19 
Source: UNICEF (2010, p. 51-63).  
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Table 10: Under-five mortality rates: Trend data of average versus poorest quintiles in 
selected Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries  
  National Average    Poorest 20% 
Country (survey years)  1995-2000   2000-2005     1995-2000   2000-2005  
Benin (1996/2001)  179  156    208  198 
Burkina Faso (1998-
9/2003) 
219  190    239  206 
Ethiopia (2000-2005)  187  130    159  130 
Ghana (1998/2003)  105  108    139  128 
Kenya (1998/2003)  101  110    136  149 
Malawi (2000/2004)  200  156    231  184 
Mali (1995-6/2001)  249  233    298  248 
Mozambique(1997/2003)  208  172    278  196 
Tanzania (1999/2004)  160  130    160  137 
Uganda (2000-1/2006)  154  146    192  172 
Bangladesh (1996-
7/2004) 
124  94    141  121 
Cambodia (2000/2005)  117  101    155  127 
Indonesia (1997/2002-3)  67  53    109  77 
Nepal (1996-2001)  135  105    156  130 
Viet Nam (1997-2002  44  31    63  53 
Source: Vandemoortele and Delamonica (2010). 
The causal chain from international agreement to policy change to development outcomes is 
a long one with many confounding influences. Given that, it is impossible to say with any 
certainty what was the impact of the MDGs. Having said that, the evidence available fits a  
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story which suggests that the MDGs may well have played a role in increasing aid flows in 
the new Millennium, and that aid may have had some role in improving outcomes. At the 
same time, the weak available evidence suggests they may have had only a limited impact on 
policies in developing countries and on the course of global broad-based poverty reduction. 
Given their evolution as DAC Development Goals (albeit from UN agreements of the 
1990s) and lack of legal authority, perhaps such a conclusion should come as little surprise. 
At the same time, given the increase in aid which flowed disproportionately towards social 
sectors, and was of a scale commensurate with MDG ‘costing studies’ which attempted to 
calculate how much it would cost to meet the Goals, the evidence of only somewhat more 
rapid progress is a concern. On the positive side, aid may well have played a role. On the 
cautionary side, and as suggested by the more cautious of costing studies in the beginning, 
that role was partial, and had to involve changes in developing country policies as well.  
What does this exercise suggest for any second round of MDGs? First of all, much of the 
confusion around progress related to the current set of MDGs may derive from choices 
made to include indicators for which data was very weak (not least maternal mortality), base 
target levels on politics not realistic assessment of potential progress and to translate global 
goals into country goals without recognizing how much higher this was raising the bar on 
rates of global progress. Any MDGs 2.0 thus need targets for which good historical data is 
available.  
Second, as the most powerful impact of the MDGs appears to have been on aid flows, but 
the impact of that aid on outcomes is difficult to assess and plausibly muted, a new round 
might consider more directly tying aid flows to MDG outcomes. One approach would be 
cash on delivery –donors would commit to provide funding to countries which 
outperformed historical norms of progress equal to the estimated unit cost of that more 
rapid progress. This would add teeth to the MDG process, making it more than a global 
statement of intent.  
Finally, the results of the original MDG process should instill a sense of humility. The 
MDGs have been a powerful force in framing debate and providing donors with a 
framework for action. But broad-based development is a complex, long-term endeavor. 
However high-level the conference that agrees it, there is only so much a declaration can do.   
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Total ODA Per Capita to Low and Middle Income 
Countries, 1990-2009








































































































































































































Total ODA for Health & Education to Developing 





































Source: CDI, Center for Global Development, 2011


















Average CDI Score Not Including the Aid Component, 





Source: CDI, Center for Global Development, 2011



















Source: CDI, Center for Global Development, 2011
*2003 does not include South Korea 
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Average Population-Weighted CPIA Score, by Region, 
2005-2009





























Average Population-Weighted CPIA Social 
Inclusion Score, by Region, 2005-2009 
































Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total), by 



































































































Immunization Rates, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 













   
To meet a global target of an average 50% reduction, 
we would expect around half of all countries to see 
less than 50% reduction, and around half of all 
countries to see a greater than 50% reduction… 
…to meet a global target of every country seeing a 
50% decline, all countries have to pass the 50% 
threshold, suggesting a far higher global average 
performance. 
 































































































Immunization Rates, Measles (% of children ages 12-
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